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I. INTRODUCTION'

Self-determination movements 2 are global phenomena that perpetually
tug at the strings of a world order based on the principles of sovereignty and
*

Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Rebecca I. Grazier Professor of Law and International

Relations at American University. He is also the co-founder and President of the Public International
Law.& Policy Group (PILPG), a global pro bono law firm providing assistance to parties engaged in
peace negotiations and drafting post-conflict constitutions. PhD Cambridge, JD Stanford Law School,
AB UC Davis. Dr. Williams has advised nearly two dozen states and governments on peace
negotiations and drafting post-conflict constitutions. The authors are grateful to Melissa Benedict for
her outstanding research contributions.
**
Abigail Avoryie is a Law Fellow at PILPG providing legal assistance on PILPG's Syria
and Yemen projects. Prior to joining PILPG, she worked in Chambers at the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

***
Carlie Armstrong is a Senior Research Associate supporting PILPG's work in Syria and
Yemen on issues of peace negotiation and constitutional reform.
1.
This article is adapted from a speech given by Dr. Paul Williams in 2014 at the annual
International Law Weekend Conference in New York.
2.
The term self-determination in this article is used to characterize the various movements
around the world where populations are seeking to gain greater political autonomy. Complete
independence is not necessarily the ultimate, or necessary outcome of self-determination movements.
Rather, this article views self-determination movements as dynamic and nuanced with the ultimate
outcomes and goals greatly varying by state. In some instances a system of shared sovereignty may
benefit parties, in other instances the solution may be to remain unified. Ultimately there are several
potential outcomes to self-determination movements.

426

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 21:2

territorial integrity. 3
Despite the near constant and widespread
reaffirmation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity by the
international community, in the last twenty-five years nearly three-dozen
new states have emerged.
Some new states have arisen from the dissolution of states, while
others have seceded from states which then continue to exist, and a few
have emerged from the last vestiges of colonialism/trusteeship. A number
of other sub-state entities have gained substantially enhanced autonomy as a
result of efforts to exercise greater self-determination. Sub-state entities are
achieving statehood or enhanced autonomy in a wide range of geographic
locations-including Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Europe, and the Western
Hemisphere-and from a broad spectrum of geopolitical contexts,
including democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian and post-conflict
transitional systems. 4
Currently, there are over seventy active self-determination movements
around the globe, and this trend seems far from dissipating.' Many of these
self-determination movements generate sovereignty-based conflicts
3.
See generally Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth
of Bangladesh in Retrospect, 1 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 71, 93 (1978-1979); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination
in International Law-The Tragic Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad(West Pakistan) and Dacca (East
Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321, 322 (1972); Ved P. Nanda, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination:
Revisiting Self-Determination as an InternationalLaw Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-Cold
War Era, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443,444 (1997).
4.
See Matt Rosenberg, NEW COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: The 34 New Countries Created
Since 1990 (2015), http://geography.about.com/cs/countries/a/newcountries.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2015); see Adam Taylor, The 9 Newest Countries in the World, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2014), available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/20l4/09/ 6/the-9-newest-countries-in-theworld/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). Recently independent states include: Armenia, Sept. 21, 1991;
Azerbaijan, Aug. 30, 1991; Belarus, Aug. 25, 1991; Estonia, Sept. 6, 1991; Georgia, Apr. 9, 1991;
Kazakhstan, Dec. 16, 1991; Kyrgyzstan, Aug. 21, 1991; Latvia, Sept. 6,1991; Lithuania, Mar. 11; 1990
(officially recognized Sept. 17, 1991); Moldova, Aug. 27, 1991; Russia, Aug. 24, 1991; Tajikistan, Sept.
9, 1991; Turkmenistan, Oct. 27, 1991; Ukraine, Nov. 24, 1991; Uzbekistan, Sept. 1, 1991; Croatia, June
25, 1991; Slovenia, June 25, 1991; Macedonia: Sept. 8, 1991 & Sept. 17, 1991; Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Feb. 29, 1992; Serbia and Montenegro (as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Apr. 17,
1992; The Czech Republic, Jan. 1, 1993; Slovakia, Jan. 1, 1993; Eritrea, May 25, 1993; East Timor
(Timor-Leste), May 20, 2002; Montenegro, June 3, 2006; Serbia, June 5, 2006; Kosovo, Feb. 17, 2008;
South Sudan, July 9, 2011.
5.

See Separatist Movements: Should Nations Have a Right to Self-Determination?, 2 CQ

GLOBAL RESEARCHERS, 85, 89 (2008), available at http://www.cqpress.com/docs/AffiliationsPDFs/

separatists.pdf (last visited February 7, 2015); see generally W Alejandro Sanchez & Kimberly Bullard,
On

Separatism in

Latin

America, E-INT'L

RELATIONS,

(May

20,

2013),

http://www.e-

ir.info/2013/05/20/on-separatism-in-latin-america/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); Rick Noack, These 8
places in Europe could be the next to try for independence, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/18/if-scotland-breaks-away-these-8places-in-europe-could-be-next/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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characterized by extreme violence on the part of both the parent state and
the sub-state entity, and by the potential for regional and international
instability. 6 Many of the current self-determination movements span
several generations, and are characterized by periods of revival and decline.
While three-dozen new states have emerged in the past twenty-five
years, the international community has yet to settle on an effective
framework for managing self-determination movements and their often
accompanying sovereignty-based conflicts. The failure to create an
effective strategic framework has harrowing consequences. Over twenty
million people around the world have died in sovereignty-based conflicts.7
Traditionally, sovereignty-based conflicts are addressed in one of two
ways, the "sovereignty first" approach, or the "self-determination first"
approach.8 "The predominant approach of 'sovereignty first' is typically
used by states wishing to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity."9 In
this approach, sovereignty is regarded as the foundation of statehood and a
cornerstone of international law."0 Alternatively, the "self-determination
first" approach is most often used by secessionist movements, and
presumes that all dependent peoples are entitled to exercise selfgovernment and live free of persecution."'

6.
See Paul Williams & Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap
Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 349, 352 (2004) (In the article the
authors identify sovereignty-based conflicts and examine their main characteristics as: (1) difficult to
resolve, (2) frequently give rise to terrorism, (3) give rise to human rights violation, and (4) poorly
managed by existing international law).
7.
This number is derived from compiling estimated death tolls from sovereignty-based
conflicts around the world. This number includes civilian casualties and includes conflicts dating from
1945 to 2014. See MILTON LEITENBERG, DEATHS IN WARS AND CONFLICTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 4
(3d
ed.
2006),
available at http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20060800_cdsp_
occleitenberg.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
8.
See generally HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF DETERMINATION:
THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (rev. ed., 1996); HIDEAKI SHNODA, REEXAMINING
SOVEREIGNTY: FROM CLASSICAL THEORY TO THE GLOBAL AGE (2000); Antony Anghie, Colonialism

and the Birth of InternationalInstitutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the
League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513 (2002); Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of
Sovereignty in InternationalLaw: The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 417 (1999); Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685 (1995).

9.

Williams & Pecci, supra note 6, at 352.

10.
Jamie Scudder, Territorial Integrity 1: Modern States and the International System,
EXPLORING GEOPOLITICS (2010), http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/publication-scudderjamie_
territorial integrity modern_states intemational-political systemjurisdictionpeace-westphalia-leban
onsomalia/ (last visited Feb. 7 2015).
11.

See Williams & Pecci, supra note 6, at 352.
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When used exclusively, neither approach has little utility beyond
providing a legal or political shield that states and sub-state entities rely
upon to justify their actions or inactions. Instead of providing a starting
point to solve conflicts, these seemingly mutually-exclusive approaches
often create an ideological impasse that is difficult to navigate towards a
peaceful resolution. Both failing to provide a path for peaceful resolution,
these traditional approaches are inadequate.
In order to successfully resolve the persistent and growing number of
violent and non-violent sovereignty-based conflicts, the international
community must develop a strategic framework to guide resolution of these
conflicts. Few states currently engaged in sovereignty-based conflicts have
established a transparent and equitable approach to dealing with the issue of
self-determination. Similarly third-party states called upon to mediate or
assist with the resolution of such conflicts also lack a consistent or effective
approach.
It is important to note that this article does not attempt to prescribe
independence as a solution to all sovereignty-based conflicts. Rather, this
article advocates for the creation of a strategic framework that allows
parties to reach their own resolutions to the self-determination question in a
way that minimizes violence and instability. As previously noted, to date,
no comprehensive strategic framework exists and the status quo promotes a
nebulous approach to managing self-determination movements, ultimately
fostering an atmosphere of apprehension, instability and uncertainty at the
mere mention of potential independence. It is within this atmosphere that
conflict and violence become imminent.
This article aims to encourage the international community to create a
strategic framework for managing sovereignty-based conflicts. First, this
article examines the deadly, durable and destabilizing nature of selfdetermination movements that give rise to the need for a strategic
framework. Second, this article challenges the commonly held belief that
increased economic prosperity and regional integration can quell current
and future self-determination movements. Third, this article illustrates how
the sovereignty-first approach results in missed opportunities for
developing sustainable institutions in newly independent states. Finally, the
article calls for a reevaluation and expansion of the conflict resolution
approach of earned sovereignty as a means for resolving sovereignty-based
conflicts and giving non-violent voice to self-determination movements.
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II. DANGEROUS LEGACY OF SOVEREIGNTY-BASED CONFLICTS: DEADLY,
DURABLE, AND DESTABILIZING

Since 1990, almost half of the world's conflicts have been related to
self-determination movements that seek greater autonomy or statehood. 2
Although sovereignty-based conflicts often appear as contained within a
particular territory, such crises are intimately connected to regional and
global dynamics,13 and often give rise to the commission of mass human
rights violations, population displacement, and terrorism. 4 At their core,
these conflicts are deadly, durable and destabilizing.
The predominate approaches to dealing with self-determination
movements and the accompanying sovereignty based conflicts creates a
dynamic where parties are encouraged tofight their way to independence. 5
Unaddressed self-determination movements yield a considerable death toll
that the international community often fails to acknowledge. For instance,
the twenty-year war of separation between North and South Sudan left
more than 2,000,000 dead, and displaced millions of others from their
homes.' 6 Similarly, the three-year Nigerian Biafran war for secession
resulted in an estimated 1,000,000 casualties, with some calculations
doubling or even tripling that number.' 7 In Sri Lanka, the Tamil
population's efforts to secure self-determination have led to over 65,000
deaths since 1984.18 The Chechen wars for independence resulted in over
160,000 casualties.' 9 In a single day, Saddam Hussein's government killed
5,000 people in the Kurdish-controlled town of Halabja through the use of
gas and nerve agents in an effort to suppress Kurdish moves for selfSee Monica Duffy Tot, Self-Determination, Secession, and Civil War, Terrorism and
12.
PoliticalViolence, 24 KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOV. 4, 581-82 (July 31, 2012).
See generally MYRON WEINER, THE MACEDONIAN SYNDROME, WORLD POLITICS 665
13.
(1971); see also MYRON WIENER, Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of
Refugee Flows, 21:1 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 5 (1996); see also SUSAN OLZAK, THE GLOBAL
DYNAMICS OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

(2006).

14.

Williams & Pecci, supra note 6, at 349.

15.

Paul Williams, ASIL Speech: International Law, Politics, and the Future of Kosovo, (Feb.

17, 2008).
16.

Modem Conflicts: Conflict Profile:

ECONOMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1983-2005),

Sudan (North-South Ethnic War), POLITICAL

available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/

pdf/Sudanl .pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
Nigeria Biafran War, NECROMETRICS (2011), http://necrometrics.com/20clm.htm#Biafra
17.
(last visited Feb. 7 2015).
18.

Williams & Pecci, supra note 6, at 347.

19.
Chechen official puts death tollfor 2 wars at up to 160,000, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2005),
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/15/world/europe/15iht-chech.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb.
7,2015).
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determination.21 Additionally, in just four years, the wars of secession in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia left between 150,000 and 200,000
21
people dead.
In addition to the devastating human toll these conflicts exact, these
crises are dangerously durable. A study of sovereignty-based conflicts over
nearly half a century found that only twenty-four of the seventy-two active
conflicts had been resolved.22 The average length of such conflicts was
nearly thirty years. 23 Furthermore, in assessing duration of civil conflicts
overall, sovereignty-based conflicts demonstrate greater longevity than
other internal conflicts.24
For instance, the self-determination aspirations of the Oromo in
Ethiopia have persisted since before the 1974 fall of the imperialist
regime. 25 The Oromo are Ethiopia's largest ethnic group; however, they
were subjugated by Ethiopia's Amhara imperialist government and
displaced and disenfranchised by the subsequent military regime. 26 The
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) emerged amid calls for self-determination
for the Oromo people. In 1991, a new government took control of Ethiopia,
promising greater autonomy and devolution of power to the state's
linguistically/ethnically-based administrative units, including the Oromia
region.27 The Oromo, however, argue that persistent centralization of
power by the ruling party and failure to include the Oromo in shared
decision-making has prompted the protracted conflict between the OLF and
Ethiopian government that has claimed over 750,000 lives.28
20.

IRAQI KURDS MARK 25 YEARS SINCE HALABJA GAS ATTACK, BBC.COM (Mar. 3, 2013),

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21814734 (last visited Feb. 7,2015).
21.
See Jutta Paczulla, The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton: Peace Efforts in BosniaHerzegovina, 60 INT'L J. 255, 256-57 (Winter 2004/2005); Eric C. Martin and Judith L. Miller, NGOs
and the Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Understanding Large-Scale Interorganizational
Systems, 14 INT'L J. OF VOLUNTARY AND NONPROFIT ORGS. 145, 146 (June 2003).
22.

MONTY G. MARHALL & TED ROBERT GuRR, PEACE AND CONFLICT 2003:

A GLOBAL

SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY 26-30 (2003).

23.

Id.

24.
See generally Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates & Paivi Lujala, Geography, Rebel Capacity,
and the Duration of Civil Conflict, 53 J. OF CIV. CONFLICT 544, 564 (2009).
25.
Merera Gudina, Ethnicity,DemocratizationandDecentralizationin Ethiopia,23 EASSRA
81, 88-90 (2007).
26.
See generally Mohammed Hassen, Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide Against the Oromo,
9 N.E. AFR. STUD. 15, 18 (2002); see also Gudina, supra note 25, at 87.
27.

See Gudina, supranote 25, at 91.

28.
See generally id at 92; GENOCIDE WATCH, Genocides, Politicides, and Other Mass
Murders Since 1945, http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/genocidespoliticides.html (last visited
Feb. 7 2015).
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Not only do these durable conflicts result in great devastation and
death, they also risk a deepening of the conflict as time goes on. The sixtyyear conflict between the Naga and the Indian government demonstrates
how these conflicts evolve and persist in the absence of a strategic
framework for their resolution. The Naga people occupy the northeast
region of India along the Burmese border.2 9 At the time of India's
independence from the British Empire, the Naga also sought to assert their
right to self-determination by declaring independence a day before India's
declaration.3" India firmly rejected the Naga's claim for independence and
early peace agreements faltered.3 1 Staunch in their calls for selfdetermination, the Naga held two referendums for independence.32 The
first, held in 1947, and the Indian government immediately rejected it.33
The second, held in 1951, claimed ninety-nine percent participation among
the Naga and was submitted to the United Nations, the British government,
35
and Indian government;34 all refused to recognize its legitimacy.
In the years that followed, the Indian government assumed a
containment approach toward the situation of the Naga that served only to
worsen the violence.36 The Indian government banned some of the
prominent Naga political organizations and intentionally kept them out of
critical negotiations on the status of the Naga and the designation of the
state of Nagaland.37 In developing a policy for the Naga region, the Indian
government often chose to negotiate with representatives of less relevant
groups, thereby widening fissures within the Naga political structure and
rekindling the violence both against the government and between the
parties.3 8 Additionally, some commentators argue the Indian government
has prioritized negotiation with too few factions and has neglected other
relevant political actors.39 Failure to consult the relevant actors and
29.
M. Amajeet Singh, Revisiting the Naga Conflict: What Can India Do to Resolve this
Conflict?, 24 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 794, 795 (2013).
30.

See id.

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Singh, supra note 29, at 800.

35.

Id.

36.
See generally Phyoben Odyuo, India's Conflict Management Strategy in the Northeast:
The Case of Indo-Naga Conflict, ACADEMIA.EDU (2015), available at http://www.academia.edu/
4284477/Indiasstrategyl (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
37.

See Singh, supra note 29, at 800-02.

38.

See id, at 802-03.

39.

See id at 804.
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seriously address the Naga calls for self-determination have resulted in
persistent tension and violence between the state of Nagaland and its
neighboring states with significant Naga populations.40
In failing to
implement a strategic framework to address the Naga self-determination
calls, the Indian government has prolonged an ongoing conflict with
potentially regionally destabilizing effects.41
As sovereignty-based conflicts persist and worsen, they have a
destabilizing effect not merely internally but also regionally and even
globally.
The havoc these conflicts inflict generates a number of
destabilizing outcomes, such as large refugee populations, the establishment
of war economies, and terrorist safe havens that cause additional fighting
and deaths. As the secessionist wars in the former Yugoslavia demonstrate,
sovereignty-based conflicts can devastate a region. The international
community's failure to act swiftly to resolve the conflicts in Slovenia and
Croatia allowed the fighting to spread to Bosnia. Between 150,000 and
200,000 people perished between 1991 and 1995.42 Only three years later,
ongoing ethnically-based violence in Serbian-controlled Kosovo displaced
nearly ninety-percent of the area's Albanian population. 43 Despite the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led international intervention
and corresponding financial backing, thousands perished and nearly
1,000,000 were expelled.'
As Kosovo highlights, these conflicts frequently result in the creation
of large refugee populations, which can destabilize and strain neighboring
states as they attempt to absorb those fleeing the violence. Indeed, large
influxes of refugees have been linked to destabilizing effects in the host
state, such as environmental degradation and scarcity, radicalization, civil
war spillover, and interstate tension and conflict. 45 Furthermore, it has been

40.
See M. Amarjeet Singh, NIAS Backgrounder on Conflict Resolution: The Naga Conflict,
NIAS (2012), available at http://www.nias.res.in/docs/B7-Naga.pdf (last visited Feb. 7 2015); Singh,
supra note 29, at 805-06; Army Called in After Deadly India Violence, AuAZEERA (Aug. 21, 2014),
available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/08/army-called-after-deadly-india-violence2014821112929893844.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
41.

See Army Called in After Deadly India Violence, supra note 40.

42.

CHARLES R. FIGLEY, TRAUMATOLOGY OF GRIEVING 24 (2013).

43.

War

in

Europe-Facts

&

Figures,

PBS

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/facts.html

(2014),

available

44.
Id.;
Kosovo
Conflict,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
(2015),
available
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1380469/Kosovo-conflict (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
45.

at

(last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
at

See Adrian Martin, EnvironmentalConflict Between Refugee and Host Communities, 42 J.

OF PEACE RESEARCH 329, 332 (2005); Idean Salehyan & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Refugees and the
Spread of Civil War, 60 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 335, 338 (2006); Idean Salehyan, The

Williams, Avoryie, & Armstrong
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posited that refugee flows, rather than being a mere externality of conflict,
may actually catalyze conflict within and between states.46 Conflict
between states may arise due to the presence of opposition leaders and
fighters in refugee camps, which may prompt the home state to launch
attacks against the camps within the territorial borders of the host state. 7
Additionally, armed opposition groups within the refugee populations may
seek out alliances with sympathetic local groups 4in the host state, thereby
intensifying underlying internal strife and conflict.
The destabilizing impact of refugees on the host state is exacerbated
by resource scarcity. For instance, the estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees
living in Algeria rely exclusively on humanitarian assistance and lack
opportunities for self-sufficiency. 49 The United Nations (UN) estimates
that four-fifths of the world's eleven million refugees live in the developing
world, where the host states are less able to support them.50 As a result,
citizens of the host state may view refugees as depleting already limited
resources, leading to hostility and even violence against refugee
populations.5 Of additional concern, refugee populations tend to remain
displaced for long period of time. Two-thirds of the world's refugees have
been displaced for more than five years. 2 Sovereignty-based conflicts are
no exception, with refugees fleeing to states that may lack the capacity and
infrastructure to host them.
Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees As a Source ofInternationalConflict, 52 AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 787,
789-90 (2008).
46.

See Salehyan, supranote 45, at 791.

47.

Id.

48.

See Idean Salehyan & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,

60 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 335, 343 (2006).

49.
Indeed, such large influxes of refugees have been linked to destabilizing effects in the host
state, such as environmental degradation and scarcity, radicalization, civil war spillover, and interstate
tension and conflict. Furthermore, it has been posited that refugee flows, rather than being a mere
externality of conflict, may actually catalyze conflict within and between states. Conflict between states
may arise due to the presence of opposition leaders and fighters in refugee camps, which may prompt
the home state to launch attacks against the camps within the territorial borders of the host state.
Additionally, armed opposition groups within the refugee populations may seek out alliances with
sympathetic local groups in the host state, thereby intensifying underlying internal strife and conflict.
The destabilizing impact of refugees on the host state is exacerbated by resource scarcity. For instance,
the estimated 165,000 Sahrawi refugees living in Algeria rely exclusively on humanitarian assistance.
50.
Refugees:
The Numbers, U.N., available at http://www.un.orglen/globalissues/
briefingpapers/refugees/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2015); Global Appeal 2015 Update - Populations of
Concern to UNHCR, UNHCR (2015), available at http://www.unhcr.org/5461e5ec3c.html (last visited
Jan. 28, 2015).
51.

See Salehyan & Gleditsch, supranote 48, at 344; see Martin,supra note 45, at 333.

52.

Refugees: The Numbers, supranote 50.
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For instance, the conflict for separation between North and South
Sudan resulted in hundreds of thousands of Sudanese fleeing the violence to
neighboring states. 53 As demonstrated by the experience of these refugees,
those fleeing violent conflict in their home state may encounter additional
threats to their safety or security in the host state. Sudanese refugees in
Egypt became targets of violence and suffered a brutal crackdown by police
when unarmed refugees protested outside the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees' office in 2005."4 Similarly, Eritrean refugees who fled to Sudan
during the Eritrean war for independence found themselves in overcrowded
camps with limited access to food and vulnerable to the raging Sudanese
5
conflict.1
Even seemingly latent sovereignty-based conflicts may risk sudden
escalation and threaten regional stability if left unaddressed. For instance,
the unresolved status of Western Sahara has significantly impacted
neighboring Algeria, which currently houses up to 165,000 Sahrawi
refugees.56
Furthermore, Algeria's support for the Sahrawi proindependence Polisario Front has created significant tensions with its
neighbor Morocco.57
This instability is rooted in the international
community's failure to set forth a workable framework for selfdetermination for Western Sahara's Sahrawis.

53.
2015 UNHCR country operations profile-Sudan, UNHCR (2015), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (an estimated 100,000 fled to
Kenya); UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheet, UNHCR (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
4f4c956c9.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (24,934 fled to Egypt); UNHCR Global Appeal-Uganda,
UNHCR (2005), availableat http://www.unhcr.org/41ab28e7c.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (172,000
fled to Uganda).
54.
Abeer Allam & Michael Slackman, 23 Sudanese Die as Egypt Clears Migrants' Camp,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/31/intemational/africa/
3legypt.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2015); Sarah El Masry, A Marginalized Community: Sudanese
Refugees in Egypt, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/
2012/09/05/a-marginalised-community-sudanese-refugees-in-egypt/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
55.
The United States Committee for Refugees estimated that more than 380,000 Eritrean
refugees were living in Sudan in the 1990s. U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Getting Home is Only Half the
Challenge: Refugee Reintegration in War-Ravaged Eritrea, REF WORLD 5 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3bcl9092d.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2015); see Eritrea-Sudan: A
Forgotten Refugee Problem, IRIN (Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/87300/
eritrea-sudan-a-forgotten-refugee-problem (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
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57.
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(last
visited Jan. 28, 2015); see generallyDiplomacy Over Western Sahara: Morocco v Algeria, ECONOMIST
(Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.economist.com/node/17421589 (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
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Morocco annexed the territory in 1975 as Spain began to diminish its
colonial rule. 8 In 1976, the Polisario Front established the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR) and declared independence from Morocco. 9
This declaration was followed by over a decade of armed conflict between
Morocco and the Polisario Front, which ended with a UN-brokered
ceasefire in 1991.6
The UN's plan for Western Sahara called for a
transitional period during which the UN would oversee the ceasefire
implementation as well as the preparations for a referendum on
independence or unification with Morocco. 6 ' However, twenty years later,
the transitional period has yet to commence and the parties seem no closer
to an agreement. 62 Meanwhile, forty-seven states and the African Union
maintain recognition of SADR.63 Multiple rounds of negotiations have
yielded only nominal progress and younger Sahrawis are losing patience
with the process and with the UN. 4 If the parties cannot agree on a plan
that would eventually allow the Sahrawis to vote on self-determination,
some commentators argue the situation may devolve into a full-scale armed
conflict.65 Considering King Mohammed VI of Morocco's statements that
Western Sahara will remain part of Morocco "until the end of time," the

58.
Human Rights and Freedom from State Tyranny.
Country Studies-Morocco,
DEMOCRACY WEB, availableat http://www.democracyweb.org/rights/morocco.php (last visited Jan. 28,
2015).
59.
Western Sahara/Algeria: Refugees Face Curbs on Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 18,
2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/18/westem-saharaalgeria-refugees-face-curbsrights (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
60.
U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)-Background, U.N.,
available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml (last visited Jan.
28, 2015).
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Referendum in Western Sahara, supra note 60; Sahara's Polisario Front Threatens New Armed
Struggle, YAHOO! NEWS (Nov. 9, 2014), http://news.yahoo.cornsaharas-polisario-front-threatensarmed-struggle-I 93148261 html (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
63.
Eighty-five states have recognized SADR, however, thirty-eight have since withdrawn or
frozen their recognition. White, supra note 62, at 6.
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See id. at 17; Larisa Epatko, Should Sahrawis Return to War with Morocco? 4 Young
Refugees Speak Up, PBS.ORG (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/voices-ofsahrawi-refugees/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2015); Whitney Shefte, Could War Come Back to Western
Sahara? Some of Algeria's Sahrawi Refugees Think So, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2014), available at
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current situation appears bleak without a serious change in course.66 As
history indicates, without a specified mechanism by which to seek selfdetermination, frustrated groups are more likely to view fighting their way
out as their only option.
In politically fragile states or regions, the very specter of sovereigntybased conflict can itself be destabilizing. The South Yemen independence
movement threatens to further destabilize Yemen's attempts to form a
sustainable federal democracy. 67 The Southern Yemeni population has fed
a continuous rumbling for independence since Yemen's unification in
1990.68 The desire for independence is based on the sentiments of cultural
separation and political disenfranchisement from the population and
government in the north.
Similar to other sovereignty-based conflicts, the Southern Yemen
movement has seen periods of violence and continues to promote a level of
instability that creates a safe space for terrorists to flourish. Specifically,
the continued instability and political discontent in the South offers an
appealing environment for Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to
build a stronghold. 69 As AQAP's attacks during the Houthi uprising
demonstrate, political upheaval provides a dangerous environment that
AQAP is eager and able to exploit.7 °
Moreover, groups seeking to destabilize the status quo may take up the
cause of self-determination to establish greater legitimacy and shore up
support among their desired constituency. Although these groups may seek
alternative ends entirely distinct from self-determination, the groups may
nonetheless co-opt self-determination into their other destabilizing
activities. For instance, the Congolese Resistance Patriots in the North
Kivu province have claimed separatist goals for the ethnic Mai Mai

66.
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Stephen Day, The Political Challenges of Yemen's Southern Movement, YEMEN: ON THE
BRINK, (Carnegie Paper Series 2010), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_
southmovement.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
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See generally Unification of Yemen, 1990-Yemen History, AL-BAB (May 28, 2009),
availableat http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/unity/unify.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
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population in the region as a way to generate local support.7 1 Once
activated, it is often difficult to contain the pull of the desire for selfdetermination.

72

Extremist groups who carry out ethnic or religious based violence may
seek to exploit the allure of self-determination by conducting their activities
under the guise of a sovereignty-based conflict. Although they are known
primarily for kidnappings and bombings, Nigeria's Boko Haram also
espouses aims of establishing an Islamic state within Nigeria.73 Their
activities against the Nigerian government have caused great instability and
cost over 5,000 lives.74 Similarly, the extremist organization known as the
Islamic State has waged a destabilizing and deadly war in Iraq and Syria
with the aim of creating its own state.75 The group has engaged in countless
human rights violations, from forced marriages to mass killings of civilians,
including children.76 These crimes are committed under the partial mantra
of self-determination for the Sunni populations in Iraq and Syria, and do
receive some local support on this basis.77
III. FALSE SECURITY IN ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: EUROPE'S FAILED SELF-DETERMINATION POLICY
Even integrated regional systems, such as the European Union (EU),
continue to be beset by non-violent sovereignty based conflicts grounded in

71.
Always on the Run, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/es/node/
92770/section/3 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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See Luc Torres et al., The Separatist Map of Africa, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2012),
at
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Chandler, Even ISIS Needs a Bank, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2015), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2015/0 1/islamic-state-starts-islamic-bank/384211/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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self-determination. The very existence of the EU was partly intended to
quell self-determination movements by ushering in an era of postsovereignty, based on economic prosperity and regional integration.
However, Europe nevertheless faces increasing calls for self-determination
and independence by sub-state entities.78
As Christopher K. Connolly explains, the belief that the creation of the
EU would lessen the appeal of sovereignty for groups seeking selfdetermination was partially premised on the idea that regions composed of
local governments would replace states as the predominant actors in the
EU.79 However, the rise of regions never came to pass and states remain
the primary actors within the EU political framework.8
Indeed, only
sovereign states may participate in the governing institutions of the EU,
including the European Council and the European Parliament.
As Connolly observes, the operation of EU institutions has a
"contradictory influence" on sub-state groups seeking self-determination. 8'
By granting a degree of autonomy and influence to regions, the EU may
lessen the desire of sub-state groups for full independence if they can
participate in EU affairs through regional mechanisms.82 However, the
ability of sub-state actors to prove their capacity to operate independently
of their parent state may embolden their self-determination aspirations.83
Furthermore, the continued limitation of full participation in EU institutions
to sovereign states may create greater incentives for these movements to
seek sovereignty for themselves.84 The confusion regarding under what
circumstances newly independent states could accede to the EU, serves
only to compound these issues.85
While acknowledging that each
movement for self-determination is unique, Connolly argues that the time
has come for the EU to clarify its position on the accession of newly
sovereign states.86 It also appears that the belief that economic integration
is sufficient to quell the desire for self-determination is misplaced. Rather,
perceptions of economic unfairness stemming from the need for resource
distribution, which accompanies integration, fuel self-determination desires.
78.
See Christopher K. Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the
European Union, 24 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 51, 53-54 (2013).
79.

See id. at 79-81.
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81.
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The EU unfortunately has failed to develop a coherent policy in
response to self-determination movements both within and outside its
borders. For a brief period of time in the early 1990s, the EU, then the
European Community (EC), attempted to develop such a policy. During
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the European Community
established the Badinter Arbitration Commission to determine the merit of
claims for independence. 8" The Commission's first opinion determined that
Yugoslavia was "in the process of dissolution," 8 prompting the EC to
adopt two declarations, one of which was a common recognition policy
intended to assist member states in deciding whether to recognize states
emerging from the breakup of Yugoslavia. 9 The policy indicated the
willingness of EC member states to recognize emerging states provided that
they demonstrated that they possessed a "democratic basis, had accepted
the appropriate international obligations and had committed themselves in
good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations."9
The failure of member states to act in concert and abide by the
common recognition policy ultimately forced many member states into
recognizing states that they believed had not met the requisite qualifications
enumerated in the policy. 91
Specifically, Germany's unconditional
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia prompted many member states to
recognize these states over the EU's own objections for the sake of
92
maintaining a common policy.
Europe has since avoided developing a common, or even coherent,
policy on recognition, particularly for self-determination movements within
the EU's borders. Rather, the EU is currently treating the issue of selfdetermination as an internal matter-a mistake that risks cracking the
continent's increasingly delicate unity.93
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Cyprus and Kosovo illustrate the inconsistencies and shortcomings of
the EU's "non-policy" on self-determination. In Cyprus, the EU's failure to
deal with Northern Cyprus has created a half-member EU state in which all
Cypriots are EU citizens, but EU laws and regulations govern only half the
country. The EU's disjointed policy has also impacted Kosovo, which
remains in international limbo. Kosovo is recognized by 103 countries,
excluding five EU member states, yet it is in the final stages of obtaining a
stabilization and integration agreement with the EU.94 Kosovo is a member
of the World Bank and DvIF,95 but not the United Nations.9 6
The continent's phobia of self-determination and its lack of any
cohesive approach to newly independent states leaves it ill-prepared to
address emerging self-determination movements within the EU, which will
strain the very foundation of Europe.9 7 Nowhere was this more evident
than in the European Commission's initial refusal to officially comment on
the status of an independent Scotland, followed by inconsistent comments
and signals.98 For example, Commission President Jose Manuel Barosso
declared in February 2014 that it would be "very difficult, if not
impossible" for Scotland to join the EU.99 However, the Commission failed
to clarify these statements during the lead up to the elections.'0 0
This lack of transparency led to significant speculation and posturing
on both sides of the issue. With no clear signal from the Commission,
Spain was free to threaten that it would block Scottish membership in the
EU. On the other hand, the leadership of the Scottish referendum promised

Stabilization and Association Agreement Initialed, REPUBLIC OF Kos. MINISTRY OF
94.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (July 25, 2014), available at http://www.mei-ks.net/?page=2,5,1011 (last
visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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See Lundrim Aliu & Michael Jones, Kosovo Joins World Bank, WORLD BANK (2013),
available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAUICOUNTRIES/ECAEXT/0,,print:Y-is
CURL:Y--contentMDK:22230081.-menuPK:258604--pagePK:2865106--piPK:2865128-theSitePK:2585
99,00.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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that accession could be fast-tracked in as little as eighteen months.'0 ' The
United Kingdom remained silent. With their EU membership still
uncertain, the Scots ultimately voted against independence on September
18, 2014, by a margin of 10.6 percent.10 2 By failing to establish a strategic
framework for managing calls for independence, the EU is ignoring a
continually relevant issue that has the potential to breed further uncertainty
and instability in the region.
Once the Scottish referendum was put to rest, the EU immediately
On
faced another self-determination crisis-this time in Catalonia.
November 9, 2014, almost 2,000,000 Catalonian voters turned out to
participate in a non-binding referendum for independence, eighty percent of
those who voted favored independence from Spain.'013 The referendum was
approved by the Catalonian Parliament on September 27, 2014, and was
originally slated to be a binding vote similar to the one held in Scotland." °
In the run up to the referendum, Catalonian regional Premier Atur Mas set
forth a legal basis for a binding referendum."0 5 The Spanish Prime
Minister, Rajoy, however, vowed to use the Spanish courts to block what he
considered an unconstitutional vote. 10 6
Within two days of .the
announcement of the referendum date, the Spanish government filed a

101.
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TELEGRAPH.Co.UK (Sept. 17, 2014), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-

independence/1 l101758/Spanish-Prime-Minister-gives-EU-warning-to-Scots.html
2015).
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103.
The referendum posed two questions to the Catalonian people. The first asked whether
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request for the Constitutional Court to declare the referendum illegal. 1°7 On
the same day, the Constitutional Court unanimously agreed to hear the
challenge, and automatically suspended the referendum until its legality
could be assessed.' °8 As a consequence Catalonia held the non-binding
referendum. 109
Notably a major impetus for the referendum on independence was that
the Constitutional Court had quashed an earlier effort for a more mild form
of self-determination in the form of greater autonomy. 110 In 2006,
Catalonians votedin favor of a Statute of Autonomy that, among other
provisions, declared Catalonia a "nation."'' . Spanish Prime Minister
Rajoy's party challenged the statute's constitutionality before the
Constitutional Court, which found several articles, including the declaration
of a Catalonian "nation," to be unconstitutional. 112
In light of the non-binding referendum, and the Constitutional Court
challenge, Catalonian leadership plans to call for expedited parliamentary
elections." 3 In the wake of the November 9 h referendum, the elections are
expected to substantially strengthen the majority of the pro-independence
parties, thereby operating as a defacto independence referendum."'
In addition, less than a month after the referendum, the Catalonian
leadership outlined a plan to achieve independence within eighteen

107.
Ashifa Kassam, Catalonia Independence Referendum Halted by Spain's Constitutional
Court, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/
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1862634 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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months. 1 5 As a first step, the plan invites political parties to adopt a
common platform supporting independence.' 16 While the parties have not
formally agreed, the two largest Catalonian political parties plan to continue
to negotiate through the spring of 2015." 7 In the interim, Spain has
adopted a hardline position against Mr. Mas and his deputies by filing
criminal charges against them for their facilitation of the nonbinding
vote. "8
Despite the potentially destabilizing impact of this ongoing dispute
within Spain, the domestic legal debate may be largely irrelevant to the EU.
If Catalonians eventually choose independence, they will seek international
recognition as an independent state based on the will of the people, not on
provisions of the Spanish constitution." 9 As the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) noted when reviewing the legality of Kosovo's declaration of
independence, there is no international legal bar against a sub-state entity
12 0
declaring independence.
Without a coherent and cohesive approach to these movements, the
EU has placed itself in an impossible and precarious position. If the EU
were to consider recognizing Catalonia, this action could encourage further
referenda in Belgium, Cyprus, Slovakia, Romania, and possibly Italy,
2
raising opposition from these members. '
However, if the EU denies recognition to Catalonia, this may generate
a frozen economic conflict in the core of Europe that would drain political
capital and economic resources from an economically fragile Spain. This
frozen economic conflict will also create a "state," with the Euro as its
currency and seven million Catalonians that could retain their EU
citizenship while living outside the EU. 122 Furthermore, in many European
states, non-recognition would be perceived as anti-democratic. Such a
move would be extremely difficult to justify, given that nearly two-dozen
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states have123achieved recognition by EU member states in the past twentyfive years.
As the recent referenda within EU borders demonstrate, relative
economic prosperity and regional integration do not guarantee that sub-state
entities will not seek greater internal autonomy, or even independence.
Rather, the EU remains a system built upon states and, as such, provides an
incentive for these movements to pursue self-determination. 124 With up to
twenty-five "significant" separatist movements across Europe, Catalonia
125
and Scotland are certainly not the last referenda that the will EU face.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY-FIRST AND THE FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH VIABLE NEW STATES

The international community's prevailing preference for sovereignty
above all else not only hampers the development of pragmatic policies but
also threatens regional and global stability. Even under circumstances
wherein a parent state and a sub-state entity seeking independence agree to
a step-wise process of independence, the international community's hesitant
stance threatens to prevent the implementation of transitional mechanisms
and the creation of institutions necessary to create a viable new state.
For instance, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for
Sudan envisioned a six-year interim period during which the Government
of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) would
share power while contemplating continuing unity or separation into two
independent states. 126 The parties agreed that, at the end of the interim
to
period, the people of South Sudan would take part in a referendum 12
7
decide whether to remain part of Sudan or become independent.
Although the agreement provided for devolution of power to the South
during the interim period and recognition of the South's right to self-
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determination, it also required that the parties pursue measures in
accordance with the goal of "[making] unity attractive" to the South. 12 8
The CPA was ultimately not successful in making unity attractive to
the South, partially due to the North's refusal to fully implement the terms
of the agreement that called for devolution of power to the South. 2 9 It soon
became clear that the North never intended to grant greater power and
autonomy to the South, nor planned to allocate meaningful posts within the
central government to southern leaders.13 ° Fearing that it would undermine
efforts to promote unity, the international community also failed to
contribute to building South Sudan's institutional capacity during the
interim period.' 3 ' Rather than planning for a scenario in which the South
attained independence, the self-determination-averse and sovereignty-first
driven international community opted to focus exclusively on making unity
132
attractive to the South.
This decision ultimately did a great disservice to South Sudan, whose
citizens voted nearly unanimously for independence in 2011.133 During the
interim period, the stalled implementation efforts left the South without the
necessary institutions to support the world's newest democracy. 134 Rather
than laying the groundwork for a functional democracy, the five-year
period became a missed opportunity for a peaceful transition to
independence. Without the necessary framework, underlying divisions in
the newly independent South Sudan soon boiled over into large-scale
violence. In just over a year of violence the death toll reached nearly
100,000.135
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V. LOOKING FORWARD: UTILIZING EARNED SOVEREIGNTY AS A
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING SELF-DETERMINATION
BASED CONFLICTS

Of the seventy active sovereignty-based conflicts around the world,
nearly all could benefit from a strategic framework that engenders peaceful
resolution to conflict through a clear process that involves some degree of
enhanced self-government, international engagement, and robust institution
building. Unfortunately, the status quo predominantly grants independence
to entities that fight their way to independence, which perpetuates violence
136
and instability.
Recent instances of state practice provide some hope that states beset
by sovereignty-based conflicts are ready to move from the sovereignty-first
approach and consider more flexible responses to achieve greater selfdetermination.
For example, when the British faced the Scottish
independence movement, they chose a proactive approach, accepting the
call for a referendum, and ultimately aiming to make unification attractive
by offering devolution max, full fiscal autonomy, during the final days of
the campaign . "' Similarly, in Canada, the Supreme Court determined that
Quebec did indeed have the legal right to enter into independence
negotiations, although it could not seek independence unilaterally.'3 8 The
Canadian government then negotiated a referendum, which, like the
Scottish referendum, ended with the population deciding to remain
unified. 139
Further illustrations of proactive state practice regarding selfdetermination are seen in Serbia and Montenegro, and Bougainville. In
Serbia and Montenegro, the international community worked closely with
the parties to broker a three-year treaty that created space for both parties to
deescalate tensions and build institutions in preparation for possible
independence. Montenegro's commitment to peace and stability was
rewarded by recognition from the EU and the United States as well as the
broader international community. This recognition demonstrates how the
international community can contribute and reward peaceful actors. In
Bougainville's fight for independence from Papua New Guinea, the parties
relied upon an earned sovereignty approach, which allowed for a ten-to136.
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fifteen-year period of institution building and sharing of sovereign authority
prior to a vote on possible independence. 4 '
Building upon these recent demonstrations of state practice and
formulating a cohesive and definitive path forward for future selfdetermination movements would create some certainty when groups seek to
exercise their right of self-determination. In the absence of such an
approach, each referendum is treated as a discrete event. Catalonia and
Scotland illustrate that regional integration is not a panacea for the question
of self-determination. Indeed, it may be that integrated regions would
benefit greatly, if not most, from a cohesive policy that manages selfdetermination and the possible outcome of independence, head on.
Europe needs to create a strategic framework to address any future
votes for independence. An initial step would be to place the decision for
EU accession in the hands of the parent state. In the case of Scotland, this
framework would have allowed the UK to usher Scotland through the
process for EU accession without the threat of a Spanish veto.
Catalonia, however, would most likely be shutout of the EU following
independence. Indeed, the Spanish government has made it known that,
from its perspective, a right to self-determination does not equate with a
right to full independence. 4 1 Thus, the EU also must develop a parallel
framework that can be implemented in the event that that the parent state
vetoes accession. In crafting such an approach, the EU would likely need
to consider a number of factors, such as the economic interests of the
emerging state and the EU, as well as the fate of the current EU residents
who face disenfranchisement if the new state is barred from accession.
Sub-state entities that are proactively given the opportunity to exercise
their self-determination in a meaningful way, surprisingly often choose
unification, as seen in Quebec and Scotland. 142 However, states with a long
history of violent resistance for the sake of realizing self-determination may
require a more structured framework. For states emerging from conflict or
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for parties still actively trying to fight their way out, the earned sovereignty
model provides a framework for managing self-determination by
incentivizing a cessation of hostilities to defuse the situation.
VI. CONCLUSION

In both conflict and post-conflict states, the international community
should consider applying an earned sovereignty approach as a vital
component of a coherent means of addressing self-determination. History
has demonstrated that violence in independence movements begets more
violence.
Earned sovereignty has proven successful in Serbia and
Montenegro, East Timor, Northern Ireland and Bougainville.' 43 The earned
sovereignty approach can easily be modified to apply in non-violent
sovereignty disputes.
The original earned sovereignty approach provides for a three-pronged
framework to resolving a sovereignty-based conflict:
(1) shared
sovereignty, (2) institution building, and (3) a determination of final status.
The three elements offer a flexible approach to resolving sovereigntybased conflicts. The first element, shared sovereignty, is a means of
deescalating tensions and allowing parties to gain trust and build confidence
in the conflict resolution process. The second element is institution
building, which allows the international community to assist all parties to
set up structures for governance and economic and political development.
The third element allows parties to make a final determination by either
maintaining the status quo, increasing autonomy, or granting independence.
The ultimate determination can be realized in a number of ways, but often a
referendum or negotiation between the state and the sub-state has proven
most effective.
The earned sovereignty approach also includes three optional
elements. The first optional element is phased sovereignty, which provides
for the gradual accumulation of sovereign authority by the sub-state entity.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty, which prescribes
benchmarks that the sub-state entity may meet before the ultimate
determination on sovereignty is made. Undoubtedly, the creation of
benchmarks must be handled delicately and efforts must be made to ensure
144
that benchmarks are realistic, fair, and not skewed to favor unification.
To promote fairness, the international community should include the substate entity in the creation of benchmarks and narrowly tailor benchmarks
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to fit the nuanced needs of the would-be state. The third optional element is
limitations on the sovereign
constrained sovereignty, which applies
45
state.'
new
the
of
functions
and
authority
To create a strategic framework for managing self-determination
movements, the international community should work in tandem with state
and sub-state entities to tailor earned sovereignty to the particularities of the
situation. One suitable evolution would be to include greater focus on
managing self-determination movements both internally and externally: a
so-called dual approach. Applying a dual approach to earned sovereignty
provides flexibility for the parent-state and sub-state entity to manage the
nuanced concerns of shared autonomy or complete independence, while
also allowing some management responsibilities to be allocated to the
international community.
In the dual approach to earned sovereignty, the initial examination
should begin at the domestic level. The purpose of beginning the
management process at the domestic level is three-fold. First, creating a
strategic framework that initially begins at the domestic level allows the
process of managing self-determination to give deference to the existing
rule of law mechanisms or other democratic processes in the state. These
mechanisms may include appealing to the highest courts, or conducting a
non-binding referendum on the question of self-determination. In instances
where a state does not have established rule of law or democratic processes,
the sub-state entity's efforts to peacefully engage the existing government
in a dialogue regarding self-determination are sufficient and should
constitute a good faith effort.
Second, beginning the management processes domestically allows for
both the parent-state and the sub-state entity to create a portfolio of good
faith efforts to engage the other party, ultimately enhancing the potential
likelihood of reaching a consensus. In some instances, good faith efforts
may take the form of a national dialogue, where participants can engage the
parent-state and discuss the self-determination movement in a meaningful
way. Other good faith efforts may take the form of the parent-state offering
the sub-state entity greater political autonomy.
Third, starting the process domestically allows the parent-state and
sub-state entity to take the lead and manage the process before the
international community becomes involved. By beginning the process
domestically, they can each take stock of the institutions, processes, and
initiatives that must be developed or initiated for a successful separation or
potential unification. Essentially, parties can begin to increase capacity for
institution building, and decide on benchmarks for earned sovereignty that
145.

See Williams & Pecci, supra note 6, at 349.

ILSA JournalofInternational& Comparative Law

[Vol. 21:2

address the specific needs and consider the bargaining positions of each
party.
The dual approach to earned sovereignty should also include
responsibilities for the international community. Proactivity should be the
primary responsibility of the international community when managing selfdetermination in the dual approach framework.
The international
community must be proactive because self-determination movements
quickly become deadly. When it is apparent that a sovereignty-based
dispute is arising, a duty should arise to proactively engage both parties.
This proactive engagement by the international community should take the
form of the traditional earned sovereignty framework,146 and should work in
cooperation with domestic efforts to reach a consensus.
Earned sovereignty typically develops as part of the peace process
after a sovereignty-based conflict; however it can be applied in non-violent
sovereignty-based disputes as a management mechanism.'
The
international community may be best suited to oversee the management
mechanism and should offer assistance to all states engaged in sovereigntybased disputes. Input by both parties during all stages will ultimately make
management successful.
Self-determination should be managed using a dual approach of both
domestic and international management. This dual approach may be used
as a starting point for a more comprehensive strategic framework for the
146.
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international community to successfully manage sovereignty-based
conflicts. When international oversight is needed, assistance should be
given freely and proactively. If the international community includes both
the parent-state and sub-state entity in the earned sovereignty management
process, the outcome is likely to be most successful.
The international community must establish a strategic framework to
manage self-determination movements. Self-determination movements are
a constant presence on the global scene. In the not too distant future, the
international community face renewed calls for self-determination by the
Kurdish populations in Iraq and Syria, and possibly Turkey, given the chaos
that is raging through Iraq and Syria as a result of the rise of the Islamic
State.' 48 Now is the time to think through a strategic framework that can
regulate how states request, manage, and ultimately decide on selfdetermination. As illustrated above, there are instances of state practice and
relevant discourse that may serve as a guide for the creation of a strategic
policy. 149 The status quo of battling to independence is not sustainable and
rewards the most violent actors.1 50 The clash between sovereignty and selfdetermination can no longer be left to fester and generate endless conflict.
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